For Wartime Russia, Rewards, Risks, And Limits In The Volatile Middle East

On October 16, Russian air strikes hit a furniture workshop, a sawmill, and an olive press in Syria’s Idlib Province, killing 10 civilians, including a child, according to the U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the White Helmets civil defense force.

Two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin was playing the Middle East peacemaker at a meeting with journalists from countries in the BRICS grouping of nations ahead of a summit this week, saying Moscow is ready to do whatever it can to end what he called the “terrible strikes on civilian targets in the Gaza Strip” and offering Moscow’s services as a mediator.

“I very much hope that an escalation of this conflict can be avoided,” Putin said.

While deadly Russian bombings in Syria contradict that claim, the desire to avoid a wider war may be genuine: The Kremlin is comfortable with the current level of violence in the Middle East because it can take advantage of the mayhem to further its own interests in the region, in Ukraine, and worldwide, analysts say — but Moscow is wary of a more massive conflagration.

“War, disorder, and chaotic U.S. policy have made it easier for Russia to maneuver” in the Middle East, Thanassis Cambanis, director of Century International, a branch of The Century Foundation, a U.S.-based think tank, said in an e-mailed comment to RFE/RL.

There are several reasons why the current level of bloodshed and volatility in the Middle East suits Moscow.

One is what Hanna Notte, a Berlin-based expert on Russian foreign policy, calls the “distraction dividend.” The crisis draws the world’s attention away from Ukraine, where Moscow’s forces are killing civilians almost daily in a brutal invasion that is headed for a fourth year with no end in sight.

It forces Washington and its allies to expend cash, weapons, and resources in the Middle East even as they struggle to keep Russia in check in a war in Europe whose result will have major consequences for the West.

In addition to that practical benefit, there’s a propaganda plus that may be even more important for Putin, who casts the war in Ukraine as part of a civilizational standoff with the United States and the European Union and is seeking to get as much of the world as possible close to Russia’s side as he can.

‘A Growing Tilt’

Since Putin launched the full-scale invasion of its neighbor in February 2022, “confrontation with the West over Ukraine has become the defining logic driving Russian policy” in the Middle East, Notte, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RFE/RL.

LISTEN: As it focuses on its war against Ukraine, Russia is also seeking to leverage violence in the Middle East to improve its global standing and condemn the West.

Against that backdrop, Israel’s attacks in Gaza and Lebanon are a rich vein for Moscow to mine as it courts countries in the Global South and around the world, portrays the violence in the Middle East as the product of misguided and destructive policies of the West, and of the United States in particular.

For the Kremlin, using the Middle East crisis and the war in Gaza as ammunition against Washington is a “no-brainer,” said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Washington-based Middle East Institute.

It “really does hurt the U.S., not just in…the Middle East but internationally, including in the United States,” Vatanka told RFE/RL.

At the same time, however, Russia’s leverage in the Middle East has limits. As it stands, Russia can punch above its weight in the region, claiming a substantial role without having to do very much, but the eruption of a wider war could lay those weaknesses bare.

The war against Ukraine has fueled Moscow’s “growing tilt towards the anti-Western forces in the region,” Notte said.

That means Iran, which provides Russia with weapons and helps it skirt sanctions, and what Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance”: groups including Hamas, the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group; Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is also designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, while the EU blacklists its armed wing; and the Huthi rebels in Yemen.

Limited Leverage

But Russia is still engaged in a balancing act in the Middle East: It does not want to alienate Israel or the Persian Gulf states too much. On the flip side, it has little or no chance of turning countries in the region against the United States, even if they can cooperate in some areas.

Russia and Iran have “very different systems, very different world views” and are united mainly by anti-Americanism, Vatanka said.

“Can Russia take that model and expand it to…other countries in the region, like Turkey? The answer is no,” he said. “Just because a country joins the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] or BRICS doesn’t mean it’s willing to jump teams, if you will,” and abandon the United States.

Furthermore, despite warm words and treaties — like the “comprehensive strategic partnership” pact that Russia is expected to sign soon with Iran — Moscow’s embrace of Tehran and its allies goes only as far as the Kremlin believes its own interests will take it, at least for now.

“The Russians…don’t want to empower the ‘Axis of Resistance.’ They want to use the ‘Axis of Resistance,'” he said.

For the time being, Vatanka said, Putin wants to preserve the status quo in the region, as precarious and bloody as it may be.

Others agree.

‘A Certain Impotence’

“The amount of tension and the developments have so far not threatened Russian interests or Russian positions in the region,” Notte said. “But we could sort of be stepping over a tipping point, especially if there are Israeli strikes against Iran, or a significant deterioration in Syria, where that balance could shift and…the risks start outweighing some of the benefits.”

Because the war in Ukraine is “its priority and demands so much bandwidth from Russia,” Moscow “has not wanted to see a situation in Syria where there’s significantly enhanced instability or Russia would need to…step up its efforts there,” she said.

As for Iran, an Israeli attack could put its defense industry under strain, she said, “something that Russia probably does not want to see, given this enhanced partnership that they have with the Iranians.”

“Another thing that would happen if the Israelis were to attack Iran proper is that a certain Russian impotence would potentially be exposed, because I don’t see that Russia could get involved in the defense of Iran in the case of this kind of escalation and Israeli retaliation,” Notte said. “Russia would probably have to sit on the sidelines, which could…harm Russia’s reputation.”

Moscow will continue to try to maintain balance, but “the more the ‘Axis of Resistance’ will come under pressure in the region, the more we might also see Russia giving certain assistance to Iranian partners like the Huthis, like Hezbollah,” she said. “Russia might be more forward-leaning.”